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BANKRUPTCY-ACCESS TO CIVIL COURTS-
INDIGENTS-FILING FEE
United States v. Kras, 93 S. Ct. 631 (1973).
R OBERT WILLIAM KRAS presented his voluntary petition in bankruptcy
to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York in May of 1971. With the petition his Legal Aid Society Attorneys
filed a motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of any of the
filing fees 1 required as a prerequisite to discharge. Kras alleged that he
was unable to pay the fees, even in installments, and that they should not
be required of him either because (1) he was entitled to proceed in forma
pauperis under the Federal Statute,2 or (2) because the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act, which conditioned a discharge upon payment of a filing
fee, would deprive him of his fifth amendment rights to due process and
equal protection of the laws. The District Court rejected the statutory
claim but granted the petitioner's motion on constitutional grounds. On
direct appeal 3 the Supreme Court 4 (5-4 per Blackmun, J.) reversed,
holding that Kras had neither a statutory nor a constitutional right to
proceed in bankruptcy without first meeting the fee obligations. In so
holding, the Court refused to extend the "access to the courts" principle
of Boddie v. Connecticut 5 beyond its limited facts, i.e.: an "interest of
basic importance to our society" 6 coupled with a "state monopolization
of the means for legally dissolving [the] relationship." 7
1 The fees were required by the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 32(b) (2) (1946) (no
discharge without fees being paid), § 32(c)(8) (same), § 68(c)(1) ($37.00 for
referee's salary and expense fund), § 95(g) (notice to creditors not required when
there is dismissal for failure to pay fees), § 80(a) ($3.00 filing fee to clerk), and
U.S. Supreme Court General Order in Bankruptcy § 35(4) (filing fees required for
discharge but can be paid in up to nine installments).
228 U.S.C. § 1915(a) Any court of the United States may authorize the commence-
ment, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or
appeal therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a
person who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give security
therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and
affliant's belief that he is entitled to redress.
3 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252.
4 Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, White, J.J., with Burger, C.J. concurring; Stewart,
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, J.J. dissenting.
5401 U.S. 371 (1971) (Hereinafter cited as Boddie).
6 Id. at 376.
7 Id. at 374.
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The decision settled a controversy that has produced irreconcilable
decisions in the lower courts 8 and among the commentators. 9 Justice
Blackmun adopted the reasoning of Judge Travia in the lower court
opinion and (consistent with other lower court cases 10) quickly dismissed
Kras's statutory argument. The court reached that result by noting that
the current Bankruptcy Act as originally adopted in 1898" contained
provisions that allowed waiver of fees upon the filing of an affidavit of
inability to pay. The current in forma pauperis statute 12 had its origin
in 1892.13 The Court reasoned that when Congress passed the Referee's
Salary Bill of 194614 petitions in forma pauperis were abolished15 because
".. . the 1946 statute, being later and having a positive and specific
provision for postponement of fees in cases of indigency, overrode the
earlier general provisions of Section 1915(a) (the in forma pauperis
statute). ' ' 16 This line of reasoning is a legalistic, legislative interpretation
that glosses over the fact that Section 1915(a) on its face applies to
bankruptcy proceedings because of the language ".... any suit, action or
proceedings, civil or criminal.. ." The legislative history cited by
both courts' 7 is concerned only with the inequities of the pauper
petition under the Bankruptcy Act and does not specifically exclude
the operation of Section 1915(a). This is also contrary to the court's
historical position of not interpreting a statute so that it overrules
an earlier statute by implication.' 8
Even more disappointing than the statutory construction, however,
was the court's failure to extend Boddie by not recognizing a constitutional
right of access to the court. Boddie was a class action brought on behalf
of women in Connecticut receiving welfare assistance and desiring to
8Compare In re Garland, 428 F.2d 1185 (1st Cir. 1970) (held, fees required) with
In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971) and O'Brien v. Trevethan, 336
F. Supp. 1029 (D. Conn. 1972) and Application of Ottman, 336 F. Supp. 746
(E.D. Wisc. 1972) (held, fees not required).
9 Compare Access to Bankruptcy Court for Indigents: The Extension of Boddie v.
Connecticut, 16 S.L.U.L.J. 328 (1971) with In Forma Pauperis Relief-An Endless
Road?-In re Smith, 6 U. RICH. L. REv. 175 (1971).
10 E.g., In re Garland, 428 F.2d 1185 (1st Cir. 1970), In re Smith, 341 F. Supp. 1297
(E.D. IM. 1972), In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971).
1 30 Stat. 558 (1898).
1228 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
1327 Stat. 252 (1892). See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 832-836 (1940).
14 11 U.S.C. § 68 (1946).
15Citing H.R. Rep. No. 1037, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1945); S. Rep. No. 959, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1946).
16 U.S. v. Kras, 93 S. Ct. 631, 635 (1973).
'7H.R. Rep. No. 1037, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1945); S. Rep. No. 959, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess., 7 (1946).
l8 See generally Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1937); Williams v. United
States, 289 U.S. 553 (1932), Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1899).
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obtain a divorce, but who were barred from filing their petitions by their
inability to pay filing and service costs. 19 The court chose to ignore
the "possible availability of public or private funds to enable petitioners-
appellants to defray the expense requirements at issue" in the case.20
Instead they held that the operation of Connecticut's statute 2' which
prevented Ms. Boddie and others like her from dissolving their marriages
solely because of their inability to pay the required costs was violative
of the due process clause22 of the fourteenth amendment.23 All but
one of the Justices agreed that access to the judicial process for
divorce was a matter of right, but the exact constitutional nature of
that right is confused in four separate opinions.
24
Despite this confusion, after Boddie, most commentators expected
the Supreme Court to extend the access principle to indigent bankrupts.
2 5
At least five lower courts 26 thought Boddie should and would be extended
to indigent-bankrupts. Another lower court 27 held that the fees were
unconstitutional before Boddie was decided by the Supreme Court and in
spite of the opposite result reached by the Boddie District Court.28 The
speculation that the court would not do what it did was further enhanced
by a Supreme Court case, Frederick v. Schwartz29 and a District Court
19 The undisputed allegations of Ms. Boddie's complaint listed the average cost to a
litigant for bringing an action for divorce was $60.00 including a $45.00 filing fee and
an additional $15.00 for service of process. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 373
(1971).
20 Id. at 374 n. 2.
21CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-259-61 (Supp. 1971).
22 U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the States wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
22 401 U.S. at 380.
24 401 U.S. at 372-83 (Mr. Justice Harlan writing for the majority); 401 U.S. at 383-86
(Mr. Justice Douglas concurring); 401 U.S. at 386-89 (Mr. Justice Brennan concur-
ring); 401 U.S. at 389-94 (Mr. Justice Black dissenting).
25 See, Access to Bankruptcy Court for Indigents: The Extension of Boddie v.
Connecticut, 16 S.L.U.L.J. 328, 338-39 (1971); Bankruptcy Filing Fees Deny
Indigents' Fundamental Interest In Access To Courts Under Due Process And Equal
Protection Guarantees, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1431, 1445 (1972). But see Boddie v.
Connecticut: Free Access to Civil Courts For Indigents, 76 DIcK. L. REv. 749, 768
(1972).
2 6 Along with the Eastern District of New York in the instant case there was In re
Naron, 334 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Oregon 1971); O'Brien v. Trevethan, 336 F. Supp.
1029 (D. Conn. 1972); Application of Ottman, 336 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Wisc. 1972);
and In re Smith, 341 F. Supp. 1297 (N.D. IIl. 1972)
27 In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971).
28 Id. at 1090.
29402 U.S. 386 (1971) (hereinafter referred to as Fredrick).
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case, Gatling v. Butler,30 holding that appeal filing fees can not pre-empt
the right to appeal because the appellant is unable to pay the filing
fee. Frederick and Gatling were explicitly grounded on Boddie and
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Nixon Court, now four appointees strong,3' refused to hear the
cry of the indigent and slapped them back into the 1960's with
the "rational basis" portion of the Equal Protection Doctrine. Mr. Justice
Blackmun in the majority opinion concluded that: "The rational basis
for the fee requirement is readily apparent. Congressional power over
bankruptcy, of course, is plenary and exclusive.13 2 He then attempted
to justify this by noting: "It serves also, as an incidental effect to promote
the purpose of making the bankruptcy system financially self-sufficient." 3 3
This line of reasoning ignores two basic facts. The bankruptcy system
has failed to be self-supporting since 197034 and, there is no proof
that a substantial number of indigents would file for bankruptcy if the
fees were waived for them. From the experience in Colorado after
In re Smith,3 5 just the opposite would appear to be true.30
The majority of the court refused to take the right of the poor one
more step down the due process road to equality with the affluent. This
failure to go on may signify a halt in the development of due process
concepts as an aid to the poor. Until now, the concept was expanding
steadily in many areas.
In the criminal area of the law, due process has operated to
place numerous procedural restrictions on State actions in dealing
with the criminals.3 7 Certain administrative actions have been
similarly restricted as having a facsimile to criminal proceedings
30 Gatling v. Butler 52 F.R.D. 389 (D. Conn. 1971).
31 C.J. Burger (appointed June 23, 1969); J. Blackmun (appointed May 14, 1970);
J. Powell (appointed December 9, 1971); J. Rehnquist (appointed December 15,
1971).
32 93 S. Ct. at 639.
33 Id. at 640.
34 60 GEo. L.J. 1581, 1592 (1972). See generally Jackson, Bankruptcy AdministrationThen and Now, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 249, 275 (1971).
35323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971).
36 60 GEo. L.J. 1581, 1592 n. 70 (1972) stating as follows: In eight months followingSmith, there were only three applications for waiver of fees in the 2100 personalbankruptcies administered. This happened despite the fact that Smith generated so
much local publicity that legal aid and the bar presumably were aware of its effects.National Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, Waiver of FilingFees for Indigents (Professional Staff memorandum).3T See e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (guilty plea must be a
voluntary and intelligent choice); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (dueprocess requires a record adequate for any appeal that may be brought); Klopfer
v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (accused has right to speedy trial).
4
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because of the direct involvement of the State in depriving an
individual of his rights. 38 Finally, due process has been applied
to civil cases.3
9 , 4 0
The majority opinion attempts to distinguish Boddie by giving
divorce a different "constitutional level" than bankruptcy.
41 The majority
stresses the language in Boddie that refers to the "State monopolization of
the means for legally dissolving" the marriage relationship and the
"fundamental importance" of the marriage relationship along with
the associational interests that surround marriage and divorce.4 Divorce
or death are the only legal ways to end a marriage. Bankruptcy and
death are the only legal ways to end debt. The married person can
either co-habit happily or get divorced. The potential bankrupt can either
pay his debts or go bankrupt. If a debtor's creditors are willing to
renegotiate his debt, the debtor does not need bankruptcy in much the
same way a married couple who have had a spat and then make up
do not need a divorce. Bankruptcy, like divorce, is the last resort. One
can only wonder why the court did not use the same rationale in Boddie
and refer Ms. Boddie to a marriage counselor rather than allow her a
divorce. This is in effect what the majority does when it states: "[A]
debtor, in theory, and often in actuality, may adjust his debts by
negotiated agreement with his creditors. At times, the happy passage of
the applicable limitation, or other acceptable creditor arrangement, will
provide the answer." 43 A more recent case indicates that the court
is going to stick to this "alternative" rationale.
44
38See, e.g., Goldbert v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare by state
must be accompanied by opportunity for recipient to have notice and hearing).
39See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (Connecticut filing fees for
divorce deprived indigents of access to the Court and therefore violative of
due process); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1960) (Wisconsin
prejudgment garnishment procedure held a taking of property without proper hearing
and therefore violative of due process); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965)
(insufficiency of notice in child custody proceedings); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 330 U.S. 306 (1950) (requiring that notice be reasonably
calculated under all circumstances to assure all interested parties a chance to be
heard); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897) (service must be calculated to reach
all partners when suit against partnership undertaken). See also Bennet v. Davis, 90
Me. 102, 37 A. 864 (1897) (statute requiring security in amount of assessed tax,
interest and costs as a condition on taxpayer's right to challenge forced tax sale of his
land was held to deprive a party of his right to be heard).
40 Bankruptcy Filing Fees Deny Indigents' Fundamental Interest In Access to Courts
Under Due Process and Equal Protection Guarantees, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1431, 1434(1972).
41 93 S. Ct. at 638.
42 id. at 637.
43 Id. at 638.
44 Ortwein v. Schwab, 93 S. Ct. 1172, 1174 (1973).
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Mr. Justice Blackmun displayed a cold, indifferent disbelief of
uncontroverted fact when he stated:
This [the filing fees under an extended payment plan] is a sum less
than the payments Kras makes on his couch of negligible value in
storage, and less than the price of a movie and a little more than
the cost of a pack or two of cigarettes. If, as Kras alleges in his
affidavit, a discharge in bankruptcy will afford him that new start
he so desires, and the Metropolitan then no longer will charge him
with fraud and give him bad references, and if he really needs and
desires that discharge, this much available revenue should be within
his able bodied reach when the ajudication in bankruptcy has stayed
collection and has brought to a halt whatever harassment, if any, he
may have sustained from creditors. (Footnote omitted.) 45
Mr. Justice Marshall's dissent clearly points out the error of this
reasoning. "It is perfectly proper for judges to disagree about what the
Constitution requires. But it is disgraceful for an interpretation of
the Constitution to be premised upon unfounded assumptions about
how people live."
46
There is one other curious aspect to this case. Mr. Justice Blackmun's
opinion flies in the face of precedent and law school training when he
attempts to explain the court's decision in light of the recent denial
of certiorari. 47 Justice Marshall's dissent takes the majority to task for
this shadowy illusion to the court's mystic powers when he says:
Reliance on denial of certiorari for any proposition impairs the vital-
ity of the discretion we exercise in controlling the cases we hear....
The point of our use of the discretionary writ is precisely to
prohibit that kind of speculation. When we deny certiorari no one,
not even ourselves, should think that the denial indicates a view on
the merits of the case. It ill serves Judges of the courts throughout the
country to tell them, as the majority does today, that in attempting to
determine what the law is, they must read, not only the opinions of
this court, but also the thousands of cases in which we annually
deny certiorari. 48
45 93 S. Ct. at 640.
46 Id. at 646.
47 Id. at 637.
48 Id. at 646,
Fall, 19731
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Kras signals a change in approach by the court on the question of
access to the court. The line of cases that began with Griffin appears
to have slowed at Boddie and stopped at Frederick. Kras, and not Boddie,
is currently favored by the court. In Ortwein v. Schwab49 the Court
extended the rationale of Kras in upholding an Oregon filing fee of
$25.00 for judicial appeals from rulings of the State Welfare Department.
The Court, noting that in Kras it had already "emphasized the special
nature of the marital relationship" 50 protected in Boddie, argued that
old-age assistance was of "far less constitutional significance." 5' Justices
Stewart,52 Douglas,53 Brennan,5 4 and Marshall 55 each argued in separate
dissents that Boddie and not Kras should have controlled. If the
Kras-Ortwein line of cases continues to grow, the United States will
remain locked in a "scheme of judicial review whereby justice remains
a luxury for the wealthy." 56
WILLIAM I. ARBUCKLE
49 93 S. Ct. 1172 (1973).
5o Id. at 1174.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 1175.
53 Id.
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